QinShiHuangsShlong [none/use name]

I think you are misrepresenting what I have written. I will say it again clearly. You are entrenched in an idealist framework where culture and tradition are treated as driving forces of history and development. We disagree on that at a fundamental level.

I have made arguments. You just do not accept their premises, so you treat them as if they are not arguments at all. For example, when I said bureaucracy exists across socialist and capitalist states regardless of cultural background (USSR, modern Vietnam, post-war Eastern Europe), you dismissed this by returning to civilizational continuity. When I argued that gaokao functions today due to material scarcity and labor competition, not lineage tradition, you reframed that as me denying history rather than addressing the material cause.

I have also given counter examples that were not engaged with. For instance, the Soviet Union developed deep bureaucratic contradictions without imperial examinations, Confucianism(brought up due to its deep ties to Chinese culture and tradition), or lineage culture. Patriarchy persists globally under capitalism, including in societies with little to no shared past, which shows that survival of social forms does not mean they are driven by ancient tradition.

You have clearly read many books, but reading history is not the same as applying dialectical materialism. At several points you substitute origin for causation and continuity for explanation. Where something came from is not the same as what reproduces it today.

We are arguing from different theoretical positions. That is fine. But at this point we are talking past each other because you are unwilling to let go of a cultural explanation even when material ones are presented. I think it is better to acknowledge that we simply see this differently. I would however appreciate not being bad jacketed going forward.

Thank you.

My thought process was training specifically in being grabbed for maximum time value, since in every other scenario you should be running for your life or using a weapon and the training will boost your stamina for running anyway.

Whenever a .world slop post about China is posted its always deceptichud. Do they have nothing better to do with their time than be wrong about things they don’t understand online?

Ah ok that’s my bad I’ll avoid similar jokes so from now on.

A “pirate” skull maybe…

Are pictures of them changing really that compromising? Everyone already hates them I dont think seeing their ass or balls is really going to change anything. Unless every prime minister has to get some compromising tattoo or something they need to hide.

Judo and Brazilian Jiujitsu are very effective and dont involve any head hitting so no cte. They focus on how to react if someone grabs you which is good, because in any other case you should be running away as fast as possible.

Thinking on it you’re right the bad/average really helps elevate the good/great.

China’s bamboo industry thrives as eco-friendly plastic alternative

CPC continues to show how ready they are to accommodate the global green wave, while continuing development of the productive forces at home.

Why eat in costco when any random hole in the wall/market stall/Chinese chain would probably taste better and be cheaper/similarly priced?

它 is specifically for non human things. I am a human.

When talking about benefit of the doubt that is talking about me the person behind the account and if I’m trustworthy.

As for “phalus” (are you a professor?) this is the pig pooping on its balls forum I never could have imagined penis jokes would be too much for such a place.

The guy who made his self insert a pedophile is pro slavery?

Imagine my shock

Yet I am a person and when talking about benefit of the doubt you were talking about me.

my client doesn’t show pronoun tags.

You could have said “them” you chose “it”.

The creator of the game is an active and open Australian Neo-Nazi.

Fish found in ocean.

Now — I’m — just — an — it? — I’m — not even — a — person — in — your — eyes?

That’s — not — just — rude — it’s unnecessary.

My — account — may — be — only — 5 — days — old — but — your — 小鸡鸡 — is — only — 5cm — long.

Doesn’t — feel — so — good — when — people — are — rude — for — no — reason — does — it?

We keep going in circles because you remain entrenched in an idealist framework, even while sometimes using materialist language. You constantly redirect the analysis back to historical origin, tradition, or civilizational continuity. When asked to identify concrete present-day mechanisms, the answer becomes imperial examinations, lineage culture, or institutional inheritance, rather than existing relations of production and authority.

When I distinguished between historical origin and present function, you treat that as if I am denying history itself, which allows the same claim to be restated without actually engaging the critique.

You have repeated this consistently. When comparative cases are raised (the USSR, France, Japan, Korea) instead of explaining what is materially different in China, you bypass comparison by asserting uniqueness. When patriarchy is discussed, you accept that it persists because it still performs material labor functions, but you refuse to apply that same standard to bureaucracy or lineage, never specifying what concrete economic function those traditions perform today. When the USSR collapse was raised, material transformation was replaced with cultural reversion.

This is why the discussion cannot move forward. You continusly treat history as an active causal force in itself, rather than something whose continued influence must be explained through present material conditions. Your analysis is idealist: tradition is allowed explanatory power independent of political economy. As long as that framing remains, we will keep talking past each other.

As for my writing style, it may come across as rigid or formulaic simply because this is not my native language, I am still far from 100% comfortable in it and thus fallback on standard easy to use structures to try best convey my thoughts.

I think I understand your point more clearly now, and you’re right that institutions do not vanish magically when one mode of production replaces another. I like all marxists fully accepts that superstructural forms can persist, mutate, and be repurposed under new material conditions. Patriarchy is indeed the classic example to explain this.

But this is exactly where precision matters. Patriarchy persists under capitalism not because of cultural memory alone, but because it continues to serve material functions: reproduction of labor power, unpaid domestic labor, inheritance control, and stabilization of wage relations. Its survival is not explained by history, but by utility to the dominant mode of production. Without that utility, patriarchy would decay rapidly regardless of tradition. The same standard must be applied to bureaucracy, lineage, and examination systems.

If a social form persists, scientific socialism through dialectical materialism demands we ask: what material role does it currently play? Not where it came from, but why it continues to reproduce itself today. This is where I think your argument still slips from materialism toward historical determinism. You are correct that China has unusual institutional continuity. That fact alone, however, does not explain causality. Continuity describes form; it does not explain motion.

What reproduces hierarchy today is not the memory of imperial lineage, but concrete mechanisms:

1. cadre evaluation systems
2. administrative ranking structures
3. control over resource allocation
4. credential monopolies
5. urban–rural stratification
6. uneven regional development

These mechanisms would generate elite reproduction even if the imperial examinations had never existed. This is precisely why similar phenomena appear in the USSR, Vietnam, South Korea, Singapore, and even France’s grandes écoles system, societies with no shared civilizational origin.

The resemblance is structural, not genealogical. On gaokao: yes, there is historical resonance. But resonance is not determination. The gaokao functions today as a labor-allocation mechanism under industrial conditions. Its brutality comes from scarcity and competition, not Confucian morality. If economic structure changed such that upward mobility was not concentrated into narrow credential channels, the social meaning of education would change accordingly, just as it already has for segments of the urban middle class.

That demonstrates material causation, not cultural destiny. Regarding “unwritten rules,” when have I denied their existence. But unwritten rules are not ancient ghosts; they are informal adaptations to power concentration. Wherever access to resources depends on approval from superiors, informal relations emerge, whether in Chinese ministries, Soviet factories, Wall Street firms, or Western universities.

Calling this “lineage culture” risks obscuring the real issue: bureaucratic power without sufficient mass supervision. Chairman Mao understood this clearly. The Cultural Revolution was not an attempt to annihilate tradition for its own sake. It was an attempt (however flawed in execution) to prevent the crystallization of a new bureaucratic class by mobilizing the masses against administrative privilege. Its target was not history. Its biggest target was power.

That is why Chairman Mao emphasized “those in authority taking the capitalist road,” not scholars, families, or customs as such. He did not argue that culture autonomously reproduces class society. He argued that class society reproduces culture. This is a fundamental difference. If tradition itself were the decisive force, then socialist transformation would depend primarily on ideological purification. Chairman Mao rejected that. He insisted that ideological struggle must be rooted in mass participation and material change, not moral critique.

This is also why later socialist practice emphasized institutionalization rather than permanent mobilization, not because the problem disappeared, but because contradiction must be handled at a level consistent with development.

So yes forms evolve. Yes history leaves traces. Yes people experience continuity in daily life. But dialectical materialism draws a firm line:

1. History conditions forms.
2. Material relations determine motion.
3. When explanation begins to rely on civilizational uniqueness rather than present material function, analysis loses predictive power and turns inward.

The question is not and should not be whether tradition exists. The question is what reproduces power today. That is where scientific socialists must always place their focus, not in inherited memory, but in living relations of production and authority that can actually be transformed.

There was an exactly 0% chance you were going to have a constructive conversation online with someone you barely know who is already so entrenched in their reactionsry views.

The closest thing to something positive you could possibly get out of that situation is blowing off some personal steam dunking on them, but even then I can see how that’s less appealing when they can go spreading rumors about you being a “gommie terrorist” to the amerikkkans around them who still idolize the burger reich.

You are seemingly misunderstanding my argument, leading you to arguing against a position I did not make.

At no point did I ever infer or imply Chairman Mao was an extremist, irrational, or motivated by chaos. That framing is your insertion, not a logical consequence of what I said. Recognizing the limits and contradictions of the Cultural Revolution is not equivalent to repeating Western liberal narratives. Marxism does not require us to sanctify every tactic in order to defend the revolutionary line behind it.

Chairman Mao was obviously correct that class struggle continues under socialism. He was again obviously correct that bourgeois elements can emerge within the Party itself. He was yet again correct that institutions alone do not guarantee socialist consciousness. I disputed none of this.

Your reasoning begins to depart from dialectical materialism through what you identify as the material source of those contradictions.

You are treating “culture,” “tradition,” and long civilizational memory as semi-independent causal forces, capable of reproducing class society even after the economic base has been transformed. That is the upmost of idealism.

Marxism does not deny that ideology exists. It insists that ideology is shaped and reproduced by material relations. If culture itself were decisive, then land reform, collectivization, and socialist industrialization should have failed immediately. Instead, they succeeded in abolishing entire classes that had ruled China for millennia. That alone falsifies the idea that tradition possesses autonomous historical power.

What Chairman Mao identified was not tradition acting on socialism, but material contradictions produced inside society:

1. the persistence of commodity production
2. unequal authority within the division of labor
3. administrative privilege
4. uneven development between town and countryside
5. separation between leadership and masses

These are not cultural remnants. They are structural contradictions of transition. This distinction is important.

If reaction emerges because “Chinese tradition reproduces hierarchy,” then socialism is impossible not only in China, but anywhere with history. Marxism collapses into civilizational pessimism.

Chairman Mao never argued that. He argued that new bourgeois relations emerge from socialist production itself, not from the Tang dynasty.

On the USSR: its collapse does not demonstrate the supremacy of tradition over institutions. It demonstrates the failure to maintain proletarian political power over the state and economy. The material base had already shifted long before 1991, market mechanisms, managerial autonomy, labor commodification, and elite reproduction were already dominant.

What collapsed in 1991 was not socialism’s cultural shell reverting to tsarism. It was a system whose class character had already changed. There was no feudal restoration in Russia. There was capitalist restoration. Another important distinction.

Regarding education and class mobility: yes, examination-based advancement historically functioned as a route out of poverty. But again, you are mistaking continuity of form for continuity of essence. Modern educational competition exists because:

1. industrial economies require credentialed labor
2. developmental states allocate opportunity through standardized selection
3. surplus labor competes for limited upward mobility channels

This is true in China, South Korea, Singapore, and also in France, Japan, and Germany. The Gaokao is not the imperial exam reborn. It is a modern mechanism of labor allocation under industrial conditions.

Forms may resemble each other. Their class content does not. This is precisely why Marx warned against superficial historical analogy.

Now to dialectics. You are absolutely correct that dialectical analysis must have explanatory and predictive power. But dialectics does not mean identifying one contradiction and projecting it linearly forward forever.

Dialectics analyzes motion through contradiction under specific material conditions. Your capitalism example works because Marx identified:

1. capital accumulation as the dominant motion
2. proletarianization as its necessary condition
3. surplus extraction as its internal contradiction

Now apply the same rigor to socialist transition.What is the dominant motion today? It is not tradition reproducing itself. It is the contradiction between:

1. socialist political power
2. and partial commodity-based economic mechanisms
3. under conditions of uneven development and imperialist pressure

From that contradiction arise:

1. wealth polarization
2. bureaucratic stratification
3. corruption
4. ideological tension

These phenomena are not residues of feudalism. They are contradictions produced by development itself. This is why Chairman Mao emphasized continuing revolution , not because ancient culture would resurrect itself, but because new bourgeois relations continuously emerge unless actively constrained.

That struggle cannot be permanent chaos. It must be institutionalized, regulated, corrected, and rebalanced, precisely what was missing in the late Cultural Revolution period.

To say this is not to reject Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. It is to apply Mao Zedong Thought materially, not dogmatically.

Finally, your accusation that my position reduces to “there are problems and they are being corrected” misses the point entirely. The explanatory power lies here:

1. China’s contradictions arise from accelerated socialist development using limited market mechanisms
2. those mechanisms generate bourgeois tendencies
3. the Party retains political dominance over capital
4. struggle therefore occurs primarily within the socialist state itself, not between external classes

That predicts instability, anti-corruption cycles, policy reversals, re-centralization, and ideological tightening, exactly what we observe.

That is dialectics. Not cultural fatalism. Not civilizational inheritance. Not pessimism disguised as depth. Contradictions are real. They are sharp. They are dangerous. But they are not proof that history is repeating itself, only that socialism, is a long and uneven process of transformation, not a clean rupture where motion ceases.